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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I . CAN THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA BE USED TO BAR A COLLATERAL 
ATTACK ON THE FORMER JUDGMENT? 
II. IS AN INDEPENDENT ACTION IN EQUITY TO SET ASIDE A 
JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY FRAUD A PROPER PROCEDURE? 
III. IS THIS ACTION BROUGHT FOR THE PURPOSE OF HARRASSING 
DEFENDANT, OR IS THERE A FACTUAL BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM? 
IV. CAN PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BE BARRED BY THE DIVORCE ACTION? 
V. ARE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION TO SET ASIDE FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCES AND FOR CONSPIRACY BARRED? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case concerns the issue of whether a prior divorce 
action between the parties is res judicata or a bar to a subsequent 
action by the wife against her husband for acts occurring after 
the divorce, i.e. intentional inflication of emotional distress 
(First Cause of Action), and whether she is entitled to maintain 
an independent action in equity to set aside the divorce judgment 
because of extrinsic fraud and set aside fraudulent conveyances 
entered into by her husband prior to the divorce trial. (Second, 
Third, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action). 
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Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss in the lower court. 
The Honorable Robert J. Bullock treated it as a Motion for Summary 
Judgment and granted it on the ground that the prior action 
was Res Judicata. 
Appellant urges that this court reverse the granting of 
the Summary Judgment and remand this case for pre-trial proceedings, 
discovery and trial on the issues raised by the Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In a Civil Action, filed in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County, Civil No. 58,518, the plaintiff-appellant, 
Elizabeth Joanna Knight, sought a divorce from the defendant-
respondent, John B. Knight. 
After a trial a decree of divorce was entered, dividing 
property between the parties and establishing alimony. 
After the divorce had been granted appellant learned that 
the respondent had committed extrinsic fraud outside of, and 
prior to, the trial which had deprived her of the opportunity 
to present her claim. The fraud consisted of the following 
acts: 
1. destroying or secreting evidence; 
2. preventing appellant from gaining full and accurate 
knowledge of his total assets and income; 
3. cheating, imposing upon, or dealing with appellant 
in a manner that shocks the conscience; 
4. conveying his property to 3rd persons prior to the 
di vorce tr ial ; 
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5. secretly holding unrecorded conveyances; 
6* giving purjured testimony during discovery proceedings. 
These acts were designed to deprive, and had the effect 
of depriving, appellant of a fair opportunity to present her 
claims for property and alimony in the divorce proceedings. 
In addition, fo11owing the divorce action, respondent engaged 
in an outrageous course of conduct which was intended to and 
did humiliate appellant* It was done with callous disregard 
for her feelings and for the purpose of "getting even" with 
her and punishing her, and for the purpose of causing her great 
mental suffering and emotional distress. 
As a result of this conduct the appel lant filed an independent 
action in equity against respondent. It contained five separate 
and distinct causes of action. They are: 
1. For Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 
2. To Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances; 
3. For Conspiracy (conspiring with others to do the things 
stated in the first two causes of action); 
4. To Modify, Vacate or Set Aside Judgment; obtained 
by Fraud, and for Damages; 
5. For an Equitable Division of Marital Property. 
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss which was treated 
by the Court as a Motion for Summary Judgment. He contended 
that the new action was barred under the doctrine of res judicata 
for the reason that all issues raised in the new pleadings had 
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been litigated in the prior divorce action. The lower Court 
issued Summary Judgment on that ground. (See Addendum, 
pages 1-4. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA MAY NOT BE USED 
TO BAR A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE FORMER JUDGMENT 
The lower court held that an independent action in equity 
to set aside a prior judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud 
was barred by the prior action for the reason that it is an 
attempt to relitigate the issues tried in the prior action. 
If that is true then no independent action in equity to set 
aside a prior judgment could ever be brought. No prior judgment, 
if rendered by fraud or collusion, can be used to sustain a 
claim of res judicata. 
II . 
AN INDEPENDENT ACTION IN EQUITY TO SET ASIDE 
A JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY FRAUD IS A PROPER PROCEDURE 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) permit an independent 
action in equity to set aside a prior judgment for fraud upon 
the Court. 
The case was properly pled. It is not appropriate for 




THIS ACTION IS NOT BROUGHT 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF HARRASSING DEFENDANT—THERE IS A 
FACTUAL BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
There is a factual basis for Plaintiff's claim, and through 
appropriate pre-trial discovery the Plaintiff believes that 
she will discover other evidence to support her contentions. 
IV. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS NOT BARRED BY 
THE DIVORCE ACTION 
Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress is based in part on acts occurring before the divorce 
trial and in part on acts occurring after. Obviously the divorce 
could not have litigated the issues arising out of the acts 
of defendant occurring after the divorce was concluded; and, 
as to the former acts the divorce is not res judicata either 
for the reasons that the issues involved in an intentional inf 1 iction 
of emotional distress case are different than the issues in 
a divorce. The elements of the tort are different than for 
a divorce. 
V. 
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION TO SET ASIDE FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCES AND FOR CONSPIRACY ARE NOT BARRED 
If the plaintiff is entitled to have the judgment set aside 
then her causes of action to set aside fraudulent conveyances 
and for conspiracy are not barred. They furnish the mechanisms 
to bring third parties who participated in the fraud before 
6 




THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA MAY NOT BE USED 
TO BAR A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE FORMER JUDGMENT 
The very definition of res judicata "is that an existing 
final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or col 1 us ion, 
by a Court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes 
of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated . . ." 46 
Am Jur 2d Judgments Section 394 (1969) (emphasis added). "In 
stating the doctrine of res judicata, the Courts frequently 
refer to the fact that the judgment sought to be used as a basis 
for the application of the doctrine must have been rendered 
without fraud or collusion, since it is generally held that 
the principles of res judicata may not be invoked to sustain 
fraud, and that a judgment obtained by fraud or collusion may 
not be used as a basis for the application of the doctrine of 
res judicata." 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments, Section 473 (1969). 
Defendant-Respondent's bootstrap argument, made to the 
lower court, to the effect that a prior adjudication bars a 
subsequent action to set aside that prior adjudication, assumes 
its own conclusion. The argument could only have merit if the 
prior action were not taken by fraud, but that is the very issue 
which the second action attempts to litigate. "A judgment does 
not import absolute verity, and is not regarded as conclusive, 
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where it is being subjected to a direct attack." 46 Am Jur 
2d Judgments, Section 381 (1969). 
The basic thrust of Plaintiff's FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
is to set aside the prior judgment on the ground that it was 
taken by fraud. Defendant assumes his own conclusion when he 
argues that the prior judgment precludes this action, for if 
that were the case no one could ever attack a former judgment. 
II . 
AN INDEPENDENT ACTION IN EQUITY TO SET ASIDE 
A JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY FRAUD IS A PROPER PROCEDURE 
Plaintiff's FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION is governed by Rule 
60(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court 
may, in the furtherance of justice, relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment 
for the following reasons: . . . (3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; . . ." 
The section goes on to state: 
"This Rule does not limit the power of a Court to 
entertain an i ndependent act i on to relieve a party 
from a judgment order or proceeding or to set aside 
a judgment for fraud upon the Court. The procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be 
by motion as prescribed in these Rules or by an independent 
action." (emphasis added). 
Just as in most other states, Utah recognizes that a party 
wishing to set aside a judgment may proceed in an independent 
action in equity. Liebhardt v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 Pac. 215 
(1912); Masbv v. Gisborn, 17 Utah 257, 54 Pac. 121 (1898); see 
also, Glover v. Glover, Utah, 242 P.2d, 298 (1952) (in which 
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an independent action in equity was suggested as the preferred 
procedure)• 
A. The Fourth Cause of Action States a Claim Upon Which 
Relief Can Be Granted 
In the case of Glover v. Glover, 121 Utah 362, 242, P.2d 
298 (1952), the husband persuaded the wife to quitclaim real 
property to him two days before their divorce went to tria) , 
allegedly "for purposes of convenience" in selling the property. 
He promised to sel1 it and split the proceeds with her. 
Relying upon the husband's representations, the wife did 
not mention the property in the divorce proceedings. It was 
not included in the settlement agreement or embodied in the 
decree. 
Time passed and it became apparent that the husband had 
no intentions of selling the property. Finally the wife brought 
an action to modify the divorce decree to require her husband 
to pay her a sum equal to one-half the value of the property 
or to impose a constructive trust on her share of the property. 
The issue was whether the alleged act of fraud was of a 
type that would permit the wife to challenge the decree. 
The court reiterated the familiar rule that judgments or 
decrees can only be assai]ed on direct appeal or in equity for 
extrinsic as contra-distinguished from intrinsic, fraud. J_d.. at 
299. Further the court said, "extrinsic fraud must consist 
of some act ulterior to the merits of the proceeding out of 
which the judgment arose, by which the party attacking the judgment 
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was prevented from presenting his case or was induced not to 
present it. Such fraud consists of something done by the successful 
party, preventing the adverse party from presenting all of his 
case to the court, so that there was, in fact, no adversary 
trial or decision of the issue in that case." Id, at 299. 
Applying those principles to the facts of the case, the 
court ruled for the wife, saying that because of the false promise 
of a compromise there had never been a real contest in the trial, 
[citing U. S. v. Throckmorton, 25 L.Ed.3d. 93 (1878), which 
in turn was cited in In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah 428, 182 
P. 2d 111, 118 (1947)]. Because of the wife's reliance on the 
husband's false promise, her rights in the property were never 
1itigated. 
The next major Utah case where these issues were discussed 
was Haner v. Haner, 13 U. 2d 299, 373 P.2d 577 (1962). Haner 
was a divorce action in which the wife sought to set aside a 
judgment on the ground that her husband had made false 
representations in procuring the divorce decree. 
The court' stated the law in such a way that it appeared 
that the extrinsic-intrinsic dichotemy was being abolished: 
"It is sometimes said that when a judgment is attacked collaterally 
on the ground that it was obtained by fraud or deceit it will 
be set aside only for extrinsic fraud. But we are in accord 
with the indications in the Restatement of Judgments that -this 
is too limited. It seems more realistic to say that when it 
appears that the processes of justice has been so completely 
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thwarted or distorted as to persuade the court that in fairness 
and good conscience the judgment should not be permitted to 
stand, relief should be granted." 
But then the court explained that the doctrine was still 
alive in cases where the only fraud complained of occurred inside 
the courtroom: "However, inasmuch as the plaintiff here seems 
to be relying on the ground of fraud, there is a distinction 
which it is necessary to point out. In order to justify granting 
rel ief, the al leged wrong would have to be of the type characterized 
as extrinsic fraud: that is, fraud based on conduct or activities 
outside of the court proceedings themselves; and which is designed 
and has the effect of depriving the other party of the opportunity 
to present his claim or defense." 
The court further explained that the type of fraud which 
would justify setting aside a decree is accomplished in a number 
of ways, one of which is "by destroying or secreting evidence." 
id. at 579. 
Having identified the applicable legal principles, the 
court went on to hold in favor of the husband on the ground 
that the gist of the wife's case was that at the trial her husband 
had lied about her associations with other men, and placed erroneous 
values on the properties. 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court has applied these principles 
in two cases which are practically identical to the case at 
bar. 
i 1 
The first of these is Boyce v. Boyce, Utah, 609 P.2d 928 
(1980). That was a divorce case in which the wife sought relief 
from a decree on the basis that her husband had fraudulently 
misrepresented the extent and the value of his assets in persuading 
her to enter into a settlement. 
The husband's claim was that she had the opportunity to 
evaluate the information he had given her before agreeing to 
the settlement and stipulating to the decree based thereon. 
The court ruled for the wife, saying that "the property 
settlement may be inequitable and an affront to our judicial 
system because of the possibility of fraud on the plaintiff 
and the court. 
It appears that the assets of the parties may be five times 
the amount disclosed by defendant at the time of the settlement 
agreement. The record lends support to plaintiff's contention 
that defendant prevented plaintiff from gaining full and accurate 
knowledge of his total assets by transferring corporate holdings 
to family members without relinquishing control of those assets, 
by understanding (sic-understating?) the true value of jointly-held 
property, and by avoiding compliance with court-ordered discovery." 
id. at 930. 
The court concluded that "the determination of what assets 
are subject to the divorce proceeding may not be based on 
gamesmanship calculated to obfuscate the facts; the judicial 
system is not to be manipulated in divorce proceedings by one 
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who actively and aggressively misleads the court and the opposing 
party." Jjd. at 931 . 
The second recent case is McBride v. Jones, Utah, 615 P.2d 
431 (1980). In McBride the wife instituted supplemental proceedings 
in a divorce action to modify the decree on the ground that 
the husband had deceived her about the value of family property. 
The husband countered with a motion for summary dismissal contending 
that the rights of the parties had been settled in the decree. 
In effect the husband's argument was the same as the one the 
defendant urges here. 
The trial court granted the husband's motion and dismissed 
the case, but the Supreme Court reversed, saying: "a Motion 
for Summary dismissal can properly be granted only when, even 
assuming the facts as asserted by the party moved against to 
be true, he could not prevail." _Ld. at 432. 
Basically it was the husband's argument that "if any fraud 
existed, it was intrinsic fraud and not available as a ground 
for disturbing the decree." The Supreme Court's response to 
this argument is somewhat lengthy, but bears quotation because 
of its applicability to the case at bar: 
"We acknowledge awareness and appreciation of the 
cases cited and relied upon by the plaintiff to the 
effect that intrinsic fraud will not usually be grounds 
for setting aside a judgment. The reasoning is to 
the effect that intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which 
occurs during and within the proceedings, so that 
a party exercising reasonable diligence could meet 
and have an adjudication thereon, will not justify 
relief from a judgment. Whereas, it is held that 
the only type of fraud which will justify granting 
relief from a judgment is extrinsic fraud, that is, 
the deception or misrepresentation was outside the 
13 
proceedings and effectively prevented the party from 
meeting and having the issue determined. 
It is not to be doubted that, in appropriate 
circumstances, there may be merit to the just-stated 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud, 
and the allowance of a belated collateral attack upon 
a judgment only for the latter. The principal reason 
for this is that there must be some end to litigation; 
and to serve that purpose, the findings and judgment 
on issues previously tried to triable should have 
respect and solidarity; and this includes all matters 
which could, with reasonable diligence, have been 
presented and resolved in the trial. And for that 
reason a judgment should not be disturbed except for 
compelling reasons where the interests of justice 
so demand. The other side of that proposition is 
that the courts should not forsake the interest of 
justice; and when it appears that an egregious deception 
or oppression may have been practiced, it should neither 
be condoned nor rewarded. Particularly, that this 
should not be done by allowing one to seek refuge 
in niceties of legal terminology. 
Consistent with that principle, though we remain 
committed to the desirability of respecting judgments 
and preserving their solidarity, we have heretofore 
recognized that it is more important to give consideration 
to the degree of the injustice that may have resulted 
than to terminology or labels as to th,e type of fraud 
alleged. Accordingly, in a case such as this of 
interfamily feuding, where the contentions make it 
appear that there is a substantial likelihood that 
the proof may show that a party was so cheated, imposed 
upon, or unfairly dealt with that it should shock 
the conscience of the court to allow it to stand, 
the court should resolve doubts in favor of permitting 
the parties to present their evidence and have the 
issues determined." Id. at 432. 
The Plaintiff herein, Joanna Knight, pleads, in her FOURTH 
CAUSE OF ACTION that the defendant has engaged in fraudulent 
conduct similar to that in the Boyce and McBride cases, supra, 
in that he fraudulently conveyed his property to third parties, 
and secreted properties so that a fair trial of the issues was 
effectively prevented. These outs i de-of-court activities, it 
is alleged, included transferring properties while secretly 
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taking back unrecorded reconveyances. The effect was to cheat 
her, impose upon her, and unfairly deal with her, and as a result 
the processes of justice has been so completely thwarted or 
distorted that in fairness and good conscience the judgment 
should not be permitted to stand. Whether her evidence will 
sustain those allegations is a matter which should be determined 
at the time of trial, and not by a Motion to Dismiss. 
B. The Factual Basis for Plaintiff's Claim of Fraud }s 
Not Properly Tested By a Motion for Summary Judgment 
In McBride, supra, the husband had also argued that "there 
is no factual basis for the [wife's] claim of fraud.'* "The 
court answered that contention summarily, pointing out that 
the wife's correct and sufficient rejoinder is that the averments 
of the parties are in diametric disagreement, wherefore summary 
dismissal could not properly be based on that ground, and that 
the issue would have to be resolved on the basis of the credibility 
of their respective evidence thereon." 
Ill . 
THIS ACTION IS NOT BROUGHT 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF HARRASSING DEFENDANT—THERE IS A 
FACTUAL BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
Defendant suggested, in his argument to the lower court, 
that this matter is an example of a continuing effort to annoy 
and harrass him. That is an argument about which Plaintiff's 
counsel is more than a little sensitive, because it implies 
that counsel would knowingly be a party of such conduct. 
15 
Lest there be any doubt as to whether there i s any substance 
behind plaintiff's allegations, the following is presented: 
A. Defendant cl aimed, during discovery proceedings that 
he had no equity, ownership, interest or right to acquire the 
house in which he was then and is now living: 
On November 1, 1982, attorney Don Peterson submitted 
interrogatories to the defendant. Some of the questions referred 
to the ownership of the house in which defendant was then living: 
"1, State the present address of the defendant. 
ANSWER: 870 East 3676 North, Provo, Utah. 
2. State whether or not the defendant is renting or purchasing 
the property where he is now residing. 
ANSWER: Renting. 
3. If the answer to the above-entitled interrogatory 
is that the defendant is renting, state who is the owner of 
the property and how much per month he pays rent. 
ANSWER: Kilgore Corporation, $625.00 per month. 
4. If the defendant is purchasing the property where 
he is residing or if he has an option to purchase the property, 
state the purchase price of the amount of the option to purchase. 
ANSWER: None." 
A t t o r n e y P e t e r s o n a p p a r e n t l y b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e de fendan t 
was t e l l i n g t h e t r u t h as he had been sworn t o do . Consequen t l y , 
he d i d n o t t a k e t h e d e p o s i t i o n s o f t h e s e l l e r o f t h e p r o p e r t y 
o r t h e p r i n c i p a l s i n K i l g o r e C o r p o r a t i o n . I n f a c t , as w i l l 
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be shown below, defendant had lied in answer to the interrogatories, 
and had thus thwarted plaintiff in her discovery attempts. 
B. Defendant recorded a deed to the property shortly 
after the divorce trial. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, urging 
that defendant's mysterious acquisition of this property showed 
that he had more financial resources than he admitted to at 
the trial. The defendant neatly sidestepped plaintiff's contentions 
by submitted the following by sworn affidavit: 
"(a) In the year 1981, Dorene Kilgore borrowed against 
a commission the sum of $15,500.00 from Tel urn, Inc. (Respondent's 
employer). That amount of money was one-half of a commission 
which was going to be due and owing to Mrs. Kilgore upon the 
sale of a piece of property known as Argyle Ranch. Because 
of problems not caused by Mrs. Kilgore or Telum Corporation, 
the ranch was never sold to Telum Corporation and therefore 
the commission never came due. Mrs. Kilgore owed Telum Corporation 
the sum of $15,500.00. Subsequent to the hearing of divorce 
in the above-entitled action, Mrs. Kilgore approached me about 
assuming the debt to Telum Corporation for $15,500.00 as and 
for her equity and a down payment on the home. I paid no cash 
down on the home but merely assumed the obi i gat ion which Mrs. Ki 1 gore 
had with Telum Corporation in the amount of $15,500.00. I have 
assumed the mortgage payments on the home which were substantially 
identical to the rent payment which I was then making. I am 
aware of no equity in the said home and believe I have paid 
a reasonable value for the home. I still owe Telum Corporation 
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$15,500.00 which amount I assumed for Mrs. Kilgore. I paid 
no cash for the home. I testified freely and honestly with 
regard to each and every asset which I owned on each and every 
account that I maintained." 
C. Newly Discovered Evidence Shows that the Defendant 
had Owned the House all along, and that his Former Testimony 
was False 
Following the parties' divorce trial, one Dorene Kilgore 
gave a deposition under oath in Civil Action D81-4177, in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County. That deposition was given 
on September 27, 1982. It is quoted in the "Affidavit of Joanna 
Knight in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss," signed on March 17, 
1983 and filed in action number 63,129 on or shortly after that 
date. In it Mrs. Kilgore testified that from the very beginning 
the house was bought by John Knight with his own money and put 
in her name "because he didn't want to have it entered in his 
divorce." An affidavit concerning this testimony was before 
the lower court when it ruled on the Summary Judgment. It discloses 
an issue of fact that ought to be tried. If Mrs. Kilgore's 
testimony is true, then it would support Appellant's Fourt Cause 
of Action. 
Q (By Mr. Nemelka) Let me show you what has been 
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 and ask you if you 
can identify that. 
A Yes. 
Q Have you seen that document before? 
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A Yes, of course. 
Q Would you tell us what it is. 
A It is the deed to the home in Provo. Well, It 
is in Orem. 
Q And that is a piece of property located in Provo, 
Utah, or Orem? 
A Well, it is in Orem. 
Q Do you know the specific address of the property? 
A Let me think. You have it in your things, Dick. 
It is in the house on 870 East. Okay. 
Q I don't have the address. 
A It is on 870 East, and I don't know, it is 
approximately 3600 North. I don't remember the house's 
address. 
Q Now, this document indicates that it was recorded 
on August 28 of *81 . Is that approximately the time when 
the -
A It was. 
Q wel1, that you recal1? 
A It was recorded when? 
Q August 28, 1981. 
A Yes. 
Mr. LIAPIS: Can we go off the record for a second? 
Mr. NEMELKA: Sure 
(Off the record). 
Q (By Mr. Nemelka) Go ahead, Mrs. Kilgore. 
19 
Do you recall that this property was conveyed to you 
in approximately August of 1981? 
A Yes. 
Q And would you mind telling us the circumstances 
under which the property was conveyed to you? 
A Define circumstances. What do you mean? 
Q Why it was conveyed to you. Did you pay some 
consideration for it? 
MR. LIAPIS: In other words, were you buying 
this lot? Why is it in your name. 
THE WITNESS: I bought the house. 
Q (By Mr. Nemelka) Okay. And you bought the house 
from Mr. and Mrs. Leach? 
A They were represented by their attorney, who 
was there, I have never met them. 
Q Okay. All right. Was this Reed Benson their 
attorney? 
Y Yes. He had their attorney in fact. 
Q Do you recal 1 how much you bought the house from 
them for? 
A One hundred five thousand dollars. 
Q Did you pay anything down on the house? 
A There were fifteen thousand dollars put down 
on it, yes. 
Q Was that your own personal money? 
A It was not. 
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Q Whose money was that? 
A It was John Knight's. 
Q John Knight's money? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you borrow that money from him? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did he just give you the money? 
A Yes. Because I bought the house for him. 
Q Okay. So you were buying the house for and on 
behalf of Mr. Knight? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Was t h e r e any r e a s o n why i t was p l a c e d in your 
name r a t h e r t han h i s ? 
A B e c a u s e he d i d n ' t wan t t o have i t e n t e r e d I n 
h i s d i v o r c e . 
Q Because he was go ing t h r o u g h a d i v o r c e p rocedure 
a t t h a t t ime? 
A Yes. 
Q Is this property still in your name? 
A No. It wasn't—a day later it wasn't in my name. 
I gave him a quitclaim deed the very same day this was 
signed. I owned the home for about one hour. 
Q Do you know whether in fact that quitclaim deed 
has been recorded? 
A I know it has not. He has since recorded a new 
deed. And that one was recorded in May. 
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Q Was that signed by you? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that a quitclaim deed or a warranty deed? 
A Quitclaim. 
Q Did he pay you any consideration for that? 
A No, he did not. 
Q House? 
A I did not own the house, Dick. 
Q Did you receive any commission for the sale of 
the house? 
A No, 1 did not. 
Q So it is your testimony then that you had no 
equity in the house at that time, nor do you have any in 
the house today? 
A No." 
It should be added at this point that the above testimony 
is not the only evidence which plaintiff's counsel has which 
would show that the defendant wrongfully withheld assets during 
the divorce proceedings. Plaintiff and counsel believe, and 
hope to be able to confirm through extensive discovery, that 
the defendant is a person of considerable wealth sufficient 
to justify the large prayers for punitive damages in this action. 
We believe that approximately seven years ago he defrauded a 
bankruptcy court by falsely declaring he was a pauper, and that 
his actions in this case are simply a repeat of that similar 
conduct in the earlier form. It is earnestly submitted that 
22 
when one takes the law into his own hands and abuses the orderly 
admi nstrat i on of justice by engaging in pre-trial fraudulent 
conveyances and secret transfers, whether in a bankruptcy court 
or a divorce court, this is conduct which, in the words of the 
Supreme Court, "shocks the conscience." 
As stated in McBr i de, "the court should resolve doubts 
in favor of permitting the parties to present their evidence 
and have the issues determined." J[d. at 433. 
IV. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS NOT BARRED BY 
THE DIVORCE ACTION 
Prior to the divorce the parties lived in luxury. Plaintiff 
drove a Lincoln Continental, the family enjoyed a 26' Wellcraft 
boat which was powered by two engines with aircraft-type 
superchargers so that it would travel almost 90 miles per hour, 
the family had the unlimited use of a twin engine airplane worth 
hundred of thousands of dollars, and they lived in a luxurious 
home in Sherwood Hills. The defendant admittedly earned more 
than $200,000.00 in taxable income the previous year. They 
lived in the "lap of luxury." 
Then came the divorce. Suddenly the defendant was lucky 
to be employed at $30,000.00 a year. Suddenly he could not 
(or at least did not) keep up with the temporary support payments 
of $3500.00 per month. The family home was foreclosed and, 
much to the humiliation and embarrassment of plaintiff, she 
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and the children were out in the snow. Now she is reduced to 
trying to survive on $750.00 per month support. 
P1 a i nt i ff be 1i eves: 
1. That John Knight has substantial ownership and equity 
interest in Tel urn, Inc., and related and affiliated companies. 
He lied about it during pre-trial discovery. These interests 
could be worth millions of dollars. 
2. That John Knight has income equal to the $200,000.00 
a year reported for each of the years, 1980 and 1981, and continues 
to earn that much or more. 
3. That John Knight owns substantial properties in Utah, 
Arizona, and other states. 
4. That all of his property was accumulated during the 
marriage of the parties. 
5. That John Knignt engaged in "pre-divorce planning" 
in which he transferred and conveyed properties to third parties 
to "hold" for him; and that he divested himself of substantial 
business and property interests in avoid having to share them 
with plaintiff. 
6. That after the divorce John Knight failed to pay the 
support which had been ordered by the court and thereby allowed 
the home in which appellant still lived to be foreclosed. 
7. That all of this was done not only to avoid having 
to give plaintiff a fair share of the jointly acquired property, 
but with callous disregard for her feelings and for the purpose 
of "getting even" with her and of hurting and punishing her, 
24 
and even for the purpose of causing her great mental suffering 
and emotional distress as well as humiliation and embarrassment. 
Defendant's answer, as gleaned from his points and authorities 
filed in support of his Motion to Dismiss, would be: 
1. That is not true. 
2. The subject of emotional distress has already been 
litigated in the divorce. 
Plaintiff's reply, as to the first point, is that the question 
of whether or not it is true is not a proper subject for a Summary 
Judgment. Only a trial can disclose whether plaintiff is correct. 
She has properly pled her claim. Now she is entitled to have 
it heard. 
As to the second point, this cause of action has not been 
litigated in the divorce. It culminated in the failure to pay 
support and the foreclosure of the house, which occurred after 
the divorce. 
A. The Present Suit does not involve the Same Claim, 
Demand and Cause of Action 
The elements of a cause of action for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress are outlined in Sammo 
v. Eccles, 11 Utah 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) in which the 
court said that an action for severe emotional distress 
lies: 
1. Where the defendant engaged in some conduct 
toward the plaintiff; 
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2. With the purpose of inflicting emotional 
distress; or 
3. Where any reasonable person would have known 
that such would result; 
4. And his actions are of such a nature as 
to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that 
they offend against the generally accepted standards 
of decency and morality. Id. at 374. 
B. No Issues were Adjudicated in the Divorce so 
as to Preclude the Successful Maintenance of the Plaintiff's 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
As stated above, this action does not involve the 
same claim, demand or cause of action as ,the divorce. 
The elements are different; hence the former suit does 
not bar this suit. Re: West Jordan, Inc., 7 Utah 2d 391, 
362 P.2d 105 (1958). 
But Defendant says that the i ssues of mental anguish 
and distress were litigated in the divorce—that they were 
a)ready "discussed" there. 
It is true that these issues were discussed in the 
divorce, but only for the purpose of determining whether 
grounds for divorce existed. In connection with that inquiry 
it was found that such grounds di d exist in favor of plaintiff. 
If there was res judicata as to this factual issue, 
it would be in favor of plaintiff's claim here. But the 
fact is that the issue of intentional infliction of severe 
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emotional distress was never litigated in the divorce. 
Unfortunately plaintiff cannot claim that the adjudication 
of that issue in the divorce is conclusive in this action. 
V. 
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION TO SET ASIDE FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCES AND FOR CONSPIRACY ARE NOT BARRED 
Plaintiff's attempt to set aside fraudulent conveyances 
(Second Cause of Action) is, in part, companion to her attempt 
to set aside the judgment on the ground that it was taken by 
fraud. If plaintiff is successful in setting aside the judgment, 
and there are fraudulent conveyances, her cause of action to 
set aside fraudulent conveyances is the only way to get the 
property back. Th i s cause of act i on and the one i nvo1v i ng consp i racy 
(Third Cause of Action), involve third parties who were never 
parties to the divorce proceedings. It is hoped that through 
appropriate discovery such third parties can be brought within 
the court's jurisdiction and they can be forced to reconvey 
the properties or pay damages in lieu thereof. 
Plaintiff submits that the Kilgore episode where defendant 
(1) secretly bought real property, (2) had it conveyed to 
Dorene Kilgore "because he did not want to have it entered in 
his divorce," and (3) took back a secret quitclaim deed which 
he failed to record, and (4) after the divorce had a new quitclaim 
deed prepared so he could record it in his own name, is only 
one example of a fraudulent conveyance. 
Defendant has flagrently and fraudulently deceived not 
only the plaintiff but the Court. Through this action the plaintiff 
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plans to engage in extensive discovery to uncover the true extent 
of defendant's fraud. A Summary Judgment should not be used 
to test plaintiff's proof. 
If her pleadings are true, then she is entitled to relief, 
but whether they are true can only be determined after a trial 
on the merits. The defendant's Motion should have been denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant urges that this court reverse the granting of 
the Summary Judgment and remand this case for pre-trial proceedings, 
discovery and trial on the issues raised by the Complaint. 
DATED this 21st day of FEBRUARY, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted 
Charles F. Abbott 
Attorney for Appellant 
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BRIEF to Allen K. Young, YOUNG, HARRIS & CARTER, 350 East Center, 
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postage prepaid, this 22nd day of FEBRUARY, 1985. 
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Attorney for Appellant p\knight.bri 
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In the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah 
In and For Utah County 
ELIZABETH JOANNA KNIGHT, 
JOHN B. KNIGHT, et a l . , 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff " 
CASE NUMBER 63,129 
DATED October 15, 1984 
D e f c a d i n t
 « J. Robert Bullock, JUDGE 
R U L I N G 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed herein on March 9, 
1984, is treated as a motion for summary judgment of no cause of 
action, and is granted. 
In the Court's opinion the material issues sought to be 
raised by the plaintiff herein were adjudicated in Civil No. 58518, 
Dated this 15th day of October, 1984. 
BY T H E ^ O U R T : 
ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE 
cc: Charles F. Abbott, Esg. 
Allen K. Young, Esq. 
ALLEN K. YOUNG 
YOUNG, HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
350 East Center 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 375-9801 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooc--
ELIZABETH JOANNA KNIGHT, ) 
P l a i n t i f f , ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
v s . ) 
JOHN B. KNIGHT, e t a l . , ) C i v i l No . 6 3 , 1 2 9 
D e f e n d a n t s , ) 
— o o o O o o c — 
B a s e d u p o n t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n t o D i s i r i s s f i l e d i n t h e 
a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r on t h e 9 t h d a y of M a r c h , 1 9 8 4 , t h e C o u r t 
now m a k e s and e n t e r s t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
FINDING OF FACT 
1 . T h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e m a t e r i a l i s s u e s s o u g h t t o b e 
r a i s e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f h e r e i n w e r e a d j u d i c a t e d i n C i v i l N o . 
5 8 5 1 8 . 
B a s e d upon t h e f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g of F a c t t h e C o u r t now makes 
and e n t e r s t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
1 . T h e C o u r t c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n t o D i s -
m i s s f i l e d h e r e i n on M a r c h 9 , 1 9 8 4 , i s t r e a t e d a s a m o t i o n f o r 
summary j u d g m e n t of no c a u s e of a c t i o n , and i s g r a n t e d . 
AdA-e^dc*** Vr 9— 
DATED and SIGNED this cay of October, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. PCSERT BULLOCK, Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to 
Charles F. Abbott, Attorney for the above-named plaintiff, 2696 
North University Ave. Suite 180, Frovo, Utah 84601, postageg lty A^  
?4_da prepaid this ^C. y of October, 1984, 
*"* 2 
Ad&twli/'Y-K P3 
AtLEN K. \0\KG 
YOUNG, HARRIS & CASTER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
350 Esst Center 
Frovo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 375-9801 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
ELIZABETH JOANNA KNIGHT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. KNIGHT, et al. , 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 63 , 129 
—oooOooo— 
Based upon the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusion of 
Law the Court now makes and enters the following: 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED: 
1. That the above-entitled case is dismiss with prejudice, 
no cause of action. 
DATED and SIGNED this day of October, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. ROBERT BULLOCK, Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to 
Ch'arles F. Abbott, Attorney for the above-named plaintiff, 2696 
North University Ave. Suite 180, Provo, Utah 84601, postageg 
prepaid this ^f^ day of October, 1984. 
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